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When Kritika published a special issue in 2001 on the state of the field ten 
years after the end of communism, it was logical to include a reassessment of 
the October Revolution and two pieces on the rapidly developing investigation 
of the Stalin period.1 Transnational history went unmentioned, along with 
international and comparative approaches, for they did not yet appear crucial 
to the state of the field. If “culture” was “everywhere” in the Russian history 
of the 1990s, talk of the transnational became ubiquitous in the 2000s.2 In 
retrospect, however, the first post-Soviet decade laid the groundwork for the 
proliferation of cross-border and cross-cultural approaches by furthering 
a closely related phenomenon: intensive investigation of comparative 
dimensions to Russian and Soviet history.3 
This essay argues that the interpretive implications of the transnational 
trend that crystallized in the second post-Soviet decade are most profound for 
the study of the revolutionary and communist period. This is for two reasons. 
First, the grand narratives of Soviet history have been focused internally from 
the field’s outset, heightening the impact of cross-border research. Second, 
communism’s intense ideological engagement with the outside world, 
combined with the effects of isolation from it, has the potential to generate 
a certain kind of transnational history centering on the interacting effects of 
models, contacts, and ideas—including rejections and misunderstandings. At 
the same time, from the perspective of 20 years after, transnational history 
in the Russian and Soviet field is still very much an unfinished scholarly 
revolution.
 1 “The State of the Field: Russian History Ten Years After the Fall,” special issue of Kritika 
2, 2 (2001).
 2 Laura Engelstein, “Culture, Culture Everywhere: Interpretations of Modern Russia, across 
the 1991 Divide,” Kritika 2, 1 (2001): 363–94; David L. Ransel, “Reflections on Transnational 
and World History in the USA and Its Applications,” Historisk Tidskrift, no. 4 (2007): 625–42. 
 3 On the synergy between comparative and transnational history, see Deborah Cohen and 
Maura O’Connor, eds., Comparison and History: Europe in Cross-National Perspective (New 
York: Routledge, 2004).
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The Western scholarship on Russia of the 1990s raised the question of 
Russian and Soviet modernity as a conceptual frame. The problem of modernity 
is still very much with us, but its initial posing centered on state violence, 
practices of state intervention, and the agendas of intelligentsia experts.4 
Institutionally, it was virtually inevitable after the end of the Cold War that 
Russia would be studied in ways that made its history more relevant to scholars 
in other fields. In post-1991 Russian-language scholarship there were equally 
compelling reasons to investigate Russia’s international connections, first and 
foremost with European countries: the combination of interest in previously 
restricted areas, Yeltsin-era “Westernization,” and the controversy over Russia’s 
osobyi put´ (special path) produced a wave of books under the title of “Russia 
and the West” and a research boom on cultural relations with individual 
European countries.5 Another major impulse to comparative history has been 
the “imperial turn,” which stimulated comparative studies of empire.6
But what, in fact, does the term “transnational” mean? In 2006, the 
American Historical Review ran a discussion entitled “On Transnational History.” 
The resulting forum appeared to fit the Russian field, to paraphrase Stalin, like a 
saddle on a cow: featuring fine-tuned distinctions among transnational, global, 
and world history, it centered on the meaning of transcending something 
Russia never was, the nation-state. Of course, insofar as transnational (or any 
other) approaches are disciplinary-wide trends and methodologies, Russianists 
need not necessarily define them differently. Understanding the focus of 
transnational history as the movement of “goods, technology, or people” across 
national borders, although it is perhaps most geared toward opening up the 
boundaries of fields such as U.S. history, is certainly relevant to any area.7 
 4 Peter Holquist, “ ‘Information Is the Alpha and Omega of Our Work’: Bolshevik Surveillance 
in Its Pan-European Perspective,” Journal of Modern History 69, 3 (1997): 415–50; Laura 
Engelstein, “Combined Underdevelopment: Discipline and the Law in Imperial and Soviet 
Russia,” American Historical Review 98, 2 (1993): 338–53; Engelstein, The Keys to Happiness: 
Sex and the Search for Modernity in Fin-de-Siècle Russia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1992); David L. Hoffmann and Yanni Kotsonis, eds., Russian Modernity: Politics, Knowledge, 
Practices (New York: St. Martin’s, 2000); Stephen Kotkin, “Modern Times: The Soviet Union 
and the Interwar Conjuncture,” Kritika 2, 1 (2001): 111–64. 
 5 See, for example, S. V. Chugrov, ed., Rossiia i Zapad: Metamorfozy vzaimovospriiatiia 
(Moscow: Nauka, 1993); A. V. Golubev et al., Rossiia i Zapad: Formirovanie vneshnepoliticheskikh 
stereotipov v soznanii rossiiskogo obshchestva pervoi poloviny XX veka (Moscow: Institut istorii 
RAN, 1998); five volumes of Rossiia i Italiia published between 1993 and 2003; four volumes 
of Rossiia i Germaniia published between 1998 and 2007; nine volumes of Rossiia i Frantsiia 
XVIII–XX vek published between 1995 and 2009; and many similar publications.
 6 Most recently, see the work of Aleksei Miller, including Imperiia Romanovykh i natsionalizm 
(Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2006); and Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, 
Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2010).
 7 “AHR Conversation: On Transnational History,” American Historical Review 111, 5 
(2006): 1140–65, quotations 1140. Of the six historians taking part in this forum, two were 
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However, this formulation notably omits explicit mention of the exchange of 
culture and ideas, not to mention models, practices, and images. These assume 
heightened significance for the history of both “Westernization” and a Soviet 
order that severely restricted borders and movement. 
I would like to argue that Russian Westernization in the imperial period 
and the Soviet Union’s place at the center of the communist “second world” 
impart a particular valence to cross-border research that can make a distinct 
contribution to transnational history as it is being developed more generally. 
This was a country defined by rapid yet selective Europeanization in the imperial 
period and competition with capitalism in the Soviet era. Intensive scrutiny of 
the mechanisms by which foreign models were domesticated and international 
practices, knowledge, and culture circulated across often formidable quarantines 
can bring particular dividends. In the study of Soviet communism, the received 
boundaries that need to be transcended are those of not the nation-state but 
the Iron Curtain and are thus not merely transnational but transsystemic.8 In 
this sense, the most salient aspect of border-crossing is not the movement of 
goods and technologies, although that is important, but the profound domestic 
impact of imported models and practices as well as perceptions and ideas about 
the outside world—and, by the same token, the ways the image and mythologies 
of Russia and the USSR profoundly affected observers elsewhere.9 The Russian 
emigration is also emblematic of this reciprocal impact, in that it both had an 
effect on host countries and interacted, often covertly, with the Soviet Union—
and was then reclaimed for post-Soviet Russian culture.10 Transnational history 
is thus not (necessarily) a fashionable trend to be aped from other fields; Russian 
Americanists, two were Africanists, one was a Latin Americanist, and one was a historian 
of Indian and global history. For critical explorations of the concept and historiography, see 
Patricia Clavin, “Introduction: Defining Transnationalism,” Contemporary European History 
14, 4 (2005): 421–40.
 8 György Péteri, “Nylon Curtain: Transnational and Transsystemic Tendencies in the Cultural 
Life of State-Socialist Russia and East-Central Europe,” Slavonica 10, 2 (2004): 113–23. By 
contrast, Ransel, “Reflections on Transnational and World History,” places the burgeoning 
study of relations among nationalities within the Russian Empire and the USSR at the center 
of transnational history in the field. While such interactions clearly have cross-cultural and 
international dimensions, the study of empire and borderlands also belongs to a significant 
degree to domestic Russian and Soviet history—even as it draws inspiration from the attempt 
to transcend national histories in other fields. 
 9 Here significant works include Steven G. Marks, How Russia Shaped the Modern World: 
From Art to Anti-Semitism, Ballet to Bolshevism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2003); Martin Malia, Russia under Western Eyes: From the Bronze Horseman to the Lenin 
Mausoleum (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999); Ezequiel Adamovsky, Euro-
Orientalism: Liberal Ideology and the Image of Russia in France (c. 1740–1880) (New York: 
Peter Lang, 2006); and Lev Kopelev et al., eds., Russen und Russland aus deutscher Sicht, 5 vols. 
(Munich: W. Fink, 1985–2000).
10 The work that pioneered this field of study is Marc Raeff, Russia Abroad: A Cultural History 
of the Russian Emigration, 1919–1939 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
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and Soviet history potentially offers its own distinctive and revealing type of 
transnational history.
Seen in this light, many of the component parts of what the Russian–
Soviet field offers to transnational history are far from new. Foreign observers 
have from the first been central to the study of Muscovy; the adaptation 
of European models has been similarly crucial to the study of the Petrine 
revolution. The notion that major new interpretive dividends could be 
gained by “opening up” the 18th century to cross-border research might seem 
odd to any dix-huitièmiste. This is hardly to imply that ongoing attempts 
to investigate more deeply the mechanisms of cross-border or interimperial 
interactions will not continue to yield rich results.11 Nor is it to deny that the 
emphasis on Russian–European interactions has slighted relations with many 
other key parts of the world, including the Ottoman Empire and China.12 
Rather, it is to assert that transnational history has the most far-reaching 
implications for the revolutionary and Soviet periods. It is here that the 
formative grand narratives explaining the emergence of the Soviet system—
whether ideology and political control or social forces “from below”—have 
been largely domestic in focus. For a long time, the international dimensions 
of Soviet history were examined by a small and largely segregated group of 
foreign policy specialists.13 To be sure, Soviet isolationism, autarky, and self-
proclaimed exceptionalism, which reached their extremes during the Stalin 
period, naturally reinforced this “internalist” focus. 
To assess how transnational history is changing interpretations and 
what remains to be done, the discussion of works here has to be selective. It 
focuses on only a few areas of research, those that seem most revealing about 
transnational approaches and that have far-reaching interpretive implications: 
the history of science and professional knowledge; the role of experts and 
cultural exchange; and socialist consumerism. 
Comparison, Ideology, and Exchange in the History of Science
I begin with the history of science because it so clearly modifies the claims 
of novelty associated with transnationalism. In fact, the traditional or default 
position in that field in the postwar period (itself a response to Nazi race 
science and Soviet “proletarian science”) was that the natural sciences are 
11 Here see Martin Aust, Rikarda Vul´pius [Ricarda Vulpius], and Aleksei Miller, eds., 
Imperium inter pares: Rol´ transferov v istorii Rossiiskoi imperii (1700–1917) (Moscow: Novoe 
literaturnoe obozrenie, 2010).
12 For an investigation of the former case, see “Models on the Margins: Russia and the 
Ottoman Empire,” special issue of Kritika 12, 2 (2011).
13 My own attempt to get at the international dimensions to the creation of the Soviet system 
through a transnational study is Michael David-Fox, Showcasing the Great Experiment: Cultural 
Diplomacy and Western Visitors to the Soviet Union, 1921–1941 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, forthcoming 2011).
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international and cosmopolitan. In the complex debate over how to modify 
this universalism, notions of national style in scientific thought were an 
important development. This was itself an inherently comparative enterprise 
well aware of the burgeoning investigation of the best-known cases of 
ideological influences on science such as Aryan physics and Lysenkoism.14 In 
other words, the study of Soviet science combined a long-standing attention 
to science as an international enterprise with intensive investigation of the 
impact of politics and ideology on knowledge. Ironically, the long-standing 
international concerns in the field of the history of Soviet science may have 
diminished somewhat in the wake of the opening of the former Soviet archives 
in the 1990s, whose riches seemed to lead back to the primarily domestic focus 
characteristic of much of the rest of the Soviet field. This emphasis on Soviet 
particularities made Lysenkoism, already well studied, appear so central to 
Soviet science that recent scholars saw the need to dethrone it from a central 
position.15 Others suggested that Russian–Soviet “big science” anticipated 
developments in other countries, found other ways to make Soviet science 
seem less anomalous through comparisons, or began to examine Lysenkoism 
itself in its international and global dimensions.16
In his pioneering work on the Bolshevization of the Academy of Sciences, 
the dean of Russian science studies, Loren R. Graham, demonstrated the 
same concern with the domestication of foreign models that was central 
to the study of post-Petrine Westernization.17 Most reform projects for the 
creation of research institutes were stymied by the tsarist government; and 
French, British, and U.S. examples were actively studied in the 1920s. But 
Soviet-era science administrators were especially enamored of the German 
Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft, with its applied orientation and state support. 
Ultimately, by attempting to leap beyond the German model into a system in 
which a Bolshevized Academy would encompass a vast network of research 
14 A good example is Jonathan Harwood, Styles of Scientific Thought: The German Genetics 
Community, 1900–1933 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). 
15 See Ethan Pollock, Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2008). 
16 Alexei Kojevnikov, “The Great War, the Russian Civil War, and the Invention of Big Science,” 
Science in Context 15, 2 (2002): 239–75; Nikolai Krementsov, Stalinist Science (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997). By far the most comprehensive examination of the 
international dimensions of Lysenkoism was at the “International Workshop on Lysenkoism,” 
conference held at City University of New York Graduate Center and Columbia University, 
4–5 December 2009.
17 The Imperial Russian Academy of Sciences of 1725 was itself the product of a transnational 
implantation of foreign models, primarily the Berlin model proposed to Peter the Great by 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. See Michael D. Gordin, “The Importation of Being Earnest: The 
Early St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences,” Isis 91, 1 (2000): 1–31.
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institutes, the Soviet science system was “a result of a blending of foreign, 
native, and revolutionary influences.”18 
Over three decades later, Graham has teamed up with a French 
mathematician, Jean-Michel Kantor, to probe how religious and national 
cultural orientations—that is, extra-scientific influences—are connected to 
scientific breakthroughs. While key developments in set theory originated in 
Germany and were developed in France, where they were studied by Russians 
in Paris seminars, the way forward in French mathematics in the early 20th 
century became blocked by its rationalistic, Cartesian orientation. By contrast, 
the founders of the famous Moscow School of Mathematics, Nikolai Luzin 
and Dmitrii Egorov, profoundly influenced by the Orthodox priest and 
trained mathematician Pavel Florenskii, were immersed in deeply mystical and 
religious approaches. Specifically, Florenskii and the mathematicians adhered 
to Name Worshipping (imiaslavie or imiabozhie), a heresy originating with a 
group of monks on Mt. Athos that was forcibly suppressed by Russian troops 
that stormed the monastery in 1913. Name Worshippers, whose theology was 
defined by the notion that the name of God is God himself, were immersed in 
the mystical techniques of the Jesus Prayer. 
This context, the book demonstrates, not only propelled the rise of Soviet 
mathematics but, long after any religious roots could be openly discussed, 
shaped the Moscow School’s mathematical style. Name Worshipping was 
not a precondition of the mathematical discoveries, Graham and Kantor 
conclude, but it did prompt the Russian mathematicians to assign new names 
to entities in their work on set theory. Soviet political persecution and intense 
same-sex relationships also influenced the mathematical achievement.19 
The biographical drama set against the revolutionary backdrop of political–
ideological repression strongly evokes Graham’s Ghost of the Executed 
Engineer, a work that assessed the peculiar Soviet approach to engineering and 
technocracy-in-power; the exploration of religious mysticism is not unrelated 
to one of the central concerns of Graham’s oeuvre, the sometimes productive 
influence of Marxist-Leninist philosophy on Soviet science.20 
18 Loren R. Graham, “The Formation of Soviet Research Institutes: A Combination of 
Revolutionary Innovation and International Borrowing,” Social Studies in Science 5 (1975): 
303–29, quotation 328, a thesis Kojevnikov attempts to modify by pointing to the importance 
of 1914 and early Soviet isolation (“The Great War,” 269–70). See also Graham, The Soviet 
Academy of Sciences and the Communist Party, 1927–1932 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1967). For similarly comparative works, see Graham, “Science and Values: The Eugenics 
Movement in Germany and Russia in the 1920s,” American Historical Review 82, 5 (1977): 
1133–64; and Mark B. Adams, ed., The Well-Born Science: Eugenics in Germany, France, Brazil, 
and Russia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
19 Loren R. Graham and Jean-Michel Kantor, Naming Infinity: A True Story of Religious 
Mysticism and Mathematical Creativity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009). 
20 Loren R. Graham, The Ghost of the Executed Engineer: Technology and the Fall of the Soviet 
Union (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). On the latter point, see especially 
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At the same time, neither Graham’s 1975 work on foreign models nor 
his 2009 work on Franco-Russian comparisons was intended to deeply 
investigate the actual cross-national interactions the works mentioned—say, 
during the West European tours of Academy of Sciences Permanent Secretary 
Sergei Ol´denburg in 1923 and 1926 or those Parisian seminars attended by 
the Moscow scholars.
The work of Susan Gross Solomon represents the most systematic and 
finely grained investigation in the Russian–Soviet field of the many factors and 
dimensions shaping transnational interactions in science, social science, and 
medicine. Solomon’s approach to transnational research began in the 1990s 
with carefully crafted studies of Soviet–German medical relations, turned 
next to study of the Rockefeller Foundation and Soviet–American scientific 
ties, and most recently has moved to Soviet–French interactions through 
the prism of a key intermediary.21 In her 1993 work on the Soviet–German 
syphilis expedition to Buriat Mongolia, we already find analysis of the 1928 
bilateral venture as “a classic illustration of the dynamics of cross-national 
science.”22 At the core of this work and its successors lies an analysis of the 
divergent agendas of two strange bedfellows (in this case German and Soviet 
scientists with often different views on nature and nurture, hygiene, sexual 
mores, and race). To explain agendas on both sides of an encounter Solomon 
typically sets out systematically to investigate their various dimensions; she 
evokes, in turn, international contexts, political interests and patronage, 
institutional settings, and perhaps most intensively, disciplinary frameworks 
in a time of revolutionary opportunity and flux. So closely interrogating 
a series of bilateral connections has logically led her to situate them more 
broadly among other competing networks and potential partners in other 
countries—at a time when revolutionary Russia could be perceived as a vast 
playground for unrealized plans and fantasies.23 
Graham, Science, Philosophy, and Human Behavior in the Soviet Union (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1987). 
21 For a sampling of her many publications, see Susan Gross Solomon, “Vergleichende 
Völkerpathologie auf unerforschtem Gebiet: Ludwig Aschoff’s Reise nach Russland und in den 
Kaukasus im Jahre 1930,” in Vergleichende Völkerpathologie oder Rassenpathologie, ed. Solomon 
and Jochen Richter (Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus, 1998), 1–50; Solomon and Nikolai Krementsov, 
“Giving and Taking across Borders: The Rockefeller Foundation in Russia, 1921–1927,” Minerva 
39, 3 (2001): 265–98; Solomon, “Local Knowledge or Knowledge of the Local: Rockefeller 
Foundation Officers’ Site Visits to Russia in the 1920s,” Slavic Review 62, 4 (2003): 710–33; and 
Solomon, “Entre Deux Mondes: Alexandre Nikolaevich Roubakine, 1889–1979,” in Alexandre 
Roubakine, Gorod, trans. Wladimir Berelowitch (Paris: Spiralinthe, 2010).
22 Susan Gross Solomon, “The Soviet–German Syphilis Expedition to Buriat Mongolia, 1928: 
Scientific Research on National Minorities,” Slavic Review 52, 2 (1993): 204–32, quotation 207.
23 Susan Gross Solomon, “Introduction: Germany, Russia, and Medical Cooperation between 
the Wars,” and Solomon, “Infertile Soil: Heinz Zeiss and the Import of Medical Geography 
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The point I would like to make here, however, is that this rigorous, multi-
dimensional inquiry into the factors shaping scientific and disciplinary agendas 
is combined in Solomon’s oeuvre with examination of the cultural outlooks and 
biographical dramas of key players. This links it inextricably to cultural history, 
where cross-cultural encounters, mental mapping, and images of the Other have 
long been central. For example, in Doing Medicine Together Solomon frames the 
discussion of cross-cultural transactions with a series of evocative metaphors: 
“choosing friends,” the “outsider as insider,” and “fault lines and bridges” of 
the Russian terrain.24 Solomon’s exquisitely calibrated studies of transnational 
science speak in a clear dialogue with cultural history. 
Vera Tolz, who like Graham was earlier immersed in the history of the 
Soviet Academy of Sciences, contributes two important additional elements 
to transnational approaches in the context of Russian–Soviet knowledge and 
power.25 First, in her recent work on Russian Oriental studies in the context 
of European Orientalism she effortlessly bridges the 1917 divide, showing 
how the pervasive concern with “Russia and the West” of the late imperial 
period shaped the altered, politicized scholarly orientations of the early Soviet 
Union. The most prominent generation of Orientologists after the 1880s, 
including Ol´denburg, Vasilii Bartol´d, and Nikolai Marr, developed a 
critique of European Orientalism as biased, fueled by imperialism, racism, 
and an unfounded sense of superiority over the supposedly stagnant “East.” 
They also harbored great ambitions to reverse the traditional inferiority 
of Russian science. These attitudes, sharpened during World War I, were 
radicalized in dialogue with Soviet politics and ideology in the 1920s.26 This 
dovetails with David Hoffmann’s argument that the “nurturist” orientation 
of a wide range of intelligentsia experts in Russian natural and social science 
disciplines, and not Marxism-Leninism in isolation, molded early Soviet 
disciplinary orientations.27 
A second implication of Tolz’s work on vostokovedenie has to do with the 
multidirectional impact or circulation of ideas across time and space. She 
spends much effort establishing links between Edward Said’s famous work on 
Orientalism and the earlier Russian–Soviet critique of European Orientalism—
to Russia, 1922–1930,” in Doing Medicine Together: Germany and Russia Between the Wars, ed. 
Solomon (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 3–34, 240–90.
24 Ibid., 12, 240, 260.
25 Vera Tolz, Russian Academicians and the Revolution: Combining Professionalism and Politics 
(London: St. Martin’s, 1997).
26 Vera Tolz, “European, National, and (Anti-)Imperial: The Formation of Academic Oriental 
Studies in Late Tsarist and Early Soviet Russia,” Kritika 9, 1 (2008): 53–81; the full-length 
study has appeared as Russia’s Own Orient: The Politics of Identity and Oriental Studies in the 
Late Imperial and Early Soviet Periods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
27 David L. Hoffmann, Cultivating the Masses: Modern State Practices and Soviet Socialism, 
1914–1939 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, forthcoming 2011). 
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via Arab authors of the 1960s. In her words, Said ultimately owed more to 
Ol´denburg—both essentialized the “West”—than to Foucault.28 Rather than 
chronicling a simple transfer from West to East, Tolz probes a transnational 
web of circulation, anticipations, and temporal lags.
Experts and the State
The study of science, social science, and expertise is linked to politics and 
big questions of recent Soviet historiography—human transformation, state 
violence, modernity—through the study of the intelligentsia and professionals. 
In recent decades, Russian nonparty specialists after 1917 have been viewed not 
merely as victims of political and ideological repression. In a broad shift, they 
have come to be seen as participants in the attempt to sculpt the social body 
and launch projects of human transformation that were, to be sure, channeled 
through the Bolshevik Revolution. Attention has focused most on the human 
and medical sciences and the attempt to define deviance.29 While transnational 
history is only beginning in this area, it already promises large dividends.
Hoffmann’s forthcoming study of social interventionism after World War 
I is perhaps the first full-length work of comparative history that also makes 
an archival contribution to the Soviet field. With chapters on social welfare, 
public health, reproductive policy, surveillance and propaganda, and state 
violence, this work shows in detail—with reference mainly to Germany, France, 
Britain, and the United States—how similar modern practices and concepts 
of social intervention assumed differing forms in different social, political, 
and ideological settings. At the same time, one of his major conclusions is 
that Russian and Soviet experts who drew heavily on European ideas often 
look less anomalous when compared to modernizing elites in Mexico, Iran, 
Turkey, and Japan—who also saw science, enlightenment, and a strong state 
as keys to reversing a national sense of inferiority.30 
Hoffmann’s book reinforces the notion that comparative and transnational 
history generally go hand in hand, because transnational exchange often 
illuminates similarities and differences. In Hoffmann’s primarily comparative 
work, episodes of transnational interaction illuminate how Soviet knowledge 
and techniques were developed in international networks. This type of analysis 
is most evident in the chapter on public health. Analyzing the Narkomzdrav 
Department of Foreign Information established in 1921 and the foreign 
travel of Soviet physicians, Hoffmann discusses the “modified borrowing” 
28 Tolz, “European, National, and (Anti-)Imperial,” 78–80.
29 For noteworthy recent examples, see Daniel Beer, Renovating Russia: The Human Sciences 
and the Fate of Liberal Modernity, 1880–1930 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008); 
and Kenneth M. Pinnow, Lost to the Collective: Suicide and the Promise of Soviet Socialism, 
1921–1929 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010).
30 Hoffmann, Cultivating the Masses. 
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of Soviet labor hygienists, health officials involved in disease prevention, 
efficiency experts, and industrial psychologists. In a final chapter on political 
violence, which Hoffmann links generically to other forms of interwar Soviet 
social interventionism, both the experts and the transnational element fade 
into the background.31 By then, one is tempted to conclude that this was the 
domain of the Bolshevik professionals—professional revolutionaries—whose 
realm of theoretical expertise was Marxist-Leninist ideology and whose sphere 
of applied expertise was social engineering and political repression. 
Daniel Beer discusses criminology and psychiatry as the disciplines most 
involved in consolidating a “biomedical discourse” centered around isolating 
deviance as a “social danger,” which was “an important part of the intellectual 
climate that legitimated the leadership’s assault on enemies real and imagined 
during the violent year of the Great Breakthrough.”32 But can one speak of 
a more immediate and direct domestication of international practices and 
disciplinary knowledge in the Great Terror, and in Soviet political violence more 
generally? In one intriguing study, for example, Yves Cohen has focused on the 
highly idiosyncratic Soviet reception of European and American research on 
administration and the associated technologies of administrative rule adopted 
in the Stalin era—card filing systems, telephone, telegraph, and dispatching.33 
Clearly, the transnational mode has much to offer future research into 
the intersection of practices, social science, and political violence. This 
proposition is wonderfully illustrated in the 2005 work of Francine Hirsch 
on ethnographers. Hirsch takes the new approach to intelligentsia experts 
and sets it in an international frame, writing that “the Bolsheviks and the 
ethnographers were part of the same world: both groups, along with other 
Russian intellectuals, were engaged in a pan-European conversation about 
the national idea.” Hirsch, much like Hoffmann, establishes the processes of 
“selective borrowing” by which imported ideas and practices were altered in 
the Soviet context. However, while the book discusses travel and international 
scholarly cooperation, as well as such issues as the influence of German 
models on KEPS (the Commission for the Study of the Natural Productive 
Resources of Russia, later the USSR) and the international discussion of race, 
the emphasis in much of the work is not directly on the actual mechanisms 
and processes of transmission across borders.34 Rather, Empire of Nations is 
31 Hoffmann, Cultivating the Masses, chaps. 2 and 5. Note that I am commenting, with the 
author’s permission, on the penultimate version of the forthcoming ms.
32 Beer, Renovating Russia, chap. 5, quotation 199. 
33 Yves Cohen, “Administration, politique et techniques: Réflexions sur la matérialité des 
pratiques administratives dans la Russie stalinienne (1922–1940),” Cahiers du monde russe 44, 
2–3 (2003): 269–307.
34 Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the 
Soviet Union (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005): quotations 5, 35; on travel and 
cooperation, see, e.g., 234–35, 245–46.
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most suggestive for the historiography of transnationalism for another reason. 
Two concluding chapters set the evolution of Soviet ethnographic knowledge 
in the 1930s against the backdrop of the rise to power of German National 
Socialism, showing that the external ideological threat of Nazi race science was 
central to Soviet developments. The Nazi geopolitical and ideological threat is 
key to the book’s overall argument that the 1930s represented an acceleration 
of Soviet “state-sponsored evolutionism” (creating national territories and 
official national languages and cultures) launched in the 1920s. In Hirsch’s 
work the intelligentsia experts do not merely help construct the context in 
which political violence was enacted; their own decimation at the hands of 
the NKVD during the purge era created a “feedback loop” between terror 
and ethnographic knowledge. Terrorized ethnographers and statisticians 
expunged diaspora nationalities from the official roster and “provided a 
scientific rational for the NKVD’s population policies.”35
This Nazi–Soviet interaction involves not borrowing or exchange but 
rather influence through repudiation, creating a live link between an external 
ideological–geopolitical threat and the internal order. This might best be 
termed a form of transnational entanglement. For example, Jan Plamper’s 
work on the “alchemy of power” argues that many features of the Stalin 
cult—the imperative to avoid enshrining it as a cult and hence its fragmented 
institutional underpinnings, for example—were an implicit response to the 
Fascist cult of the Duce and the Nazi Führerprinzip.36 It is rare that one 
can cite many archival documents to identify such entanglements; they are 
more frequently established out of deep knowledge of the Soviet context in 
relation to the international scene. All the same, international entanglements 
have a special resonance for the study of Soviet communism, since many 
cross-border influences were covert or semi-covert or involved competitive 
emulation or repudiation as well as imitation.37 
In Katerina Clark’s forthcoming reinterpretation of Stalinist culture, 
Moscow, the Fourth Rome, the equivalent of scientific experts in the transnational 
35 Ibid., chaps. 6, 7; quotations 8, 307. 
36 Ian [Jan] Plamper, Alkhimiia vlasti: Kul´t Stalina v izobrazitel´nom iskusstve (Moscow: 
Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2010); an English edition is forthcoming from Yale University 
Press in 2012.
37 “Fascination and Enmity: Russia and Germany as Entangled Histories, 1914–45,” special 
issue of Kritika 10, 3 (2009). On Soviet–German entanglements, see also Mark Edele and 
Michael Geyer, “States of Exception: The Nazi–Soviet War as a System of Violence, 1939–
1945,” and Katerina Clark and Karl Schlögel, “Mutual Perceptions and Projections: Stalin’s 
Russia in Nazi Germany—Nazi Germany in the Soviet Union,” in Beyond Totalitarianism: 
Stalinism and Nazism Compared, ed. Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 345–95, 396–442; the many transnational sections of Schlögel, Berlin, 
Ostbahnhof Europas: Russen und Deutsche in ihrem Jahrhundert (Berlin: Siedler, 1998), and 
Schlögel, Terror und Traum: Moskau 1937 (Munich: Carl Hanser, 2008); and, most recently, 
Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010).
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studies discussed above, mutatis mutandis, are a peripatetic, cosmopolitan, 
polyglot cohort of intellectuals and “mediators” in the cultural sphere. These 
include the avant-gardist Sergei Tret´iakov, the cultural amphibians Ilya 
Ehrenburg and Sergei Eisenstein, and the adventurer and power-broker 
Mikhail Kol´tsov. But instead of looking at one or another discipline of 
scientific or social scientific knowledge Clark’s field is the vast canvas of 1930s 
culture as a whole, and particularly the nexus of literature, architecture, and 
power. It is difficult to overstate the implications of this trailblazing work. 
Clark’s agenda is nothing less than to insert a largely missing international 
dimension to our understanding of Stalinist culture.  
Clark’s evocation of this international dimension is another illustration of 
my argument that Soviet transnational studies have the unusual opportunity 
simultaneously to theorize real and imagined, geographical and ideological 
border-crossings, the combination of which holds profound significance 
for remaking the internal order. The actual movement across borders in 
Clark’s work—which ranges from the mediators’ travel, which assumed 
outsized importance as borders closed for much of the rest of the population, 
to translations, influential cultural imports and exports, the activities of 
diasporas, and, most important, the dynamics of antifascist culture—assumes 
meaning within a grand bid to make a reconstructed Moscow into a center of 
world culture. The pursuit of cultural hegemony or what Clark would call an 
imperial dominance, spearheaded by Soviet intellectuals and ratified by the 
political leadership, paralleled the rise of Moscow as a model socialist city and 
a veritable cult of culture, in which literature and the written word assumed 
the dominant role. In place of earlier, “internalist” understandings of 1930s 
ideological and cultural shifts as a “Great Retreat” from early socialist values, 
Clark speaks about a “Great Appropriation”—not just from the Russian 
culture of the past but from the “world” heritage and from abroad. In both 
cases this mostly signifies continental Europe, the preoccupation of Soviet 
intellectuals in this period. Instead of Hoffmann and Hirsch’s selective or 
modified borrowings of concepts and practices, Clark is inclined to discuss a 
more fundamental process of cultural “reworking.”38
If one central interpretive axis on which Clark’s work turns is the reflexive 
relationship between aesthetics and politics, the other is the interplay between 
forms of imperialism and nationalism, on the one hand, and internationalism 
and cosmopolitanism, on the other. All, Clark insists, coexisted in the 
Stalinist 1930s. The pursuit of cultural dominance in fact facilitated 
cosmopolitan contact. Here Clark is not only reinterpreting Stalinism but 
attempting to provide a prehistory, one almost deliberately bracketed in 
38 Katerina Clark, Moscow, The Fourth Rome: Stalinism, Cosmopolitanism, and the Evolution 
of Soviet Culture, 1931–1941 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). I thank the 
author for providing me with the penultimate version of the manuscript.
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contemporary discussions, for key concepts of today’s literary and cultural 
studies: transnationalism, cosmopolitanism, and world literature.39 Surely 
this meta commentary on present-day transnationalism, a sometimes oblique 
thread throughout the manuscript, is a cautionary tale for naïve talk about 
transcending the national or failure to distinguish rigorously among different 
forms and meanings of cross-border exchange. 
Does the sheer scope of the international dimensions of Stalinist culture 
revealed in Clark’s work prompt us to modify our picture of Stalinism as 
one of the most isolationist and autarkic regimes of the century, or did the 
Stalin-era declaration of superiority in culture logically go hand in hand with 
the increasingly far-reaching closure of physical borders after the late 1920s? 
The approach in Moscow, the Fourth Rome for understanding the relationship 
between culture and politics under Stalin will surely provoke discussion. So, 
too, perhaps, will the issue of causality—which tends to be a central one for 
the historical discipline but not necessarily for Clark’s analysis of a cultural–
political ecosystem. Clark’s book discusses causality mainly in a revisionist 
sense of dethroning the cipher “Stalin” and the political leadership from the 
driver’s seat in all matters. In the end, so much has been written about culture 
and politics in the 1930s that the revelatory feel of Clark’s magnum opus is one 
of the best testimonies for the promise of transnational approaches. 
Socialist Consumerism and the End of Communism
As cross-border research is revising narratives about the formation of the 
Soviet system and Stalinism, it is also affecting interpretations of communism’s 
demise. The literature about Soviet consumerism—until fairly recently, a 
notion considered as dubious as Soviet modernity—provides another case in 
point about the particular physiognomy of transnational history in the field. 
Intimately linked with comparison with the outside world, in particular the 
consumer societies of the “West,” socialist consumerism was fundamentally 
about competitive, ideological comparisons and a shifting imaginaire of the 
world outside Soviet borders. 
The embrace of a form of consumerism in the context of desperate mass 
shortages of the 1930s, along with the increasing emphasis on consumer goods 
and luxuries in the context of prewar Stalinism, was the place where intensive 
study of Soviet consumption was initially launched in the Anglophone 
literature. Advertisements for ice cream, eau de cologne, contraceptives, and 
ketchup were a branch of Socialist Realism, in that they depicted images of 
abundance through goods often impossible to obtain.40 Amy Randall’s 2008 
39 Clark, introduction to ibid.
40 Catriona Kelly and Vadim Volkov, “Directed Desires: Kul´turnost´ and Consumption,” 
in Constructing Russian Culture in the Age of Revolution, 1881–1940, ed. Kelly and David 
Shepherd (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 291–313; Sheila Fitzpatrick, Everyday 
Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times. Soviet Russia in the 1930s (New York: Oxford 
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book, which concluded with a chapter stressing interwar state interventionism 
in retail trade in countries other than the USSR, challenged the notion that 
“if the masses cannot exercise their purchasing power freely or articulate their 
individuality through the consumption of particular products, then there is 
no mass consumer culture.” Soviet state interventionism was not unique in 
mobilizing consumers for political and economic ends, even if the politicized 
nature of Soviet consumption was especially overt. Yet socialist consumption 
was part of a broader cultural or even civilizational mission of overcoming 
backwardness by promoting “cultured” behavior (kul´turnost´ ). “In contrast 
to the capitalist dream world,” Randall writes, “the Soviet version urged 
citizens to imagine retailing and consumption as vehicles for fostering socialist 
goals. Communist authorities conjured up a vision in which the retail sector 
would become yet another realm of modernity.”41 The result was a particular 
version of a national, mass consumer culture—a distinctive “dream world” 
even within an economy of shortages.
At the same time, actual border crossings were clearly crucial here as well. 
In the mid-1930s, the Soviet state sent numerous delegations to London, 
Berlin, and New York to study retailing and “cultured trade.” Jukka Gronow 
opened his 2003 work, Caviar with Champagne, with Anastas Mikoian’s 
two-month visit to the United States in 1936, where he and his delegation 
toured hundreds of food industry factories and became particularly enamored 
of mass-produced, prepackaged, and canned items such as powdered milk, 
frankfurters, and ice cream. Although it was subsequently forgotten, the Old 
Bolshevik commissar’s infatuation resulted in a number of kiosks built before 
1941 to serve the products of what Mikoian rapturously called “machines 
that make 5,000 steaks an hour”: hamburgers.42 
The 1939 Main Meat Administration (Glavmiaso) advertisement by an 
unknown artist promotes such prepackaged foodstuffs as borscht and cutlets as a 
“full meal in 20 minutes.” The accompanying frame for this new kind of food—a 
University Press, 1999), 90–93. In recent Russian historiography, research on material culture 
and consumption was initially carried out in the context of the study of everyday life. For 
a prominent example, see Nataliia Borisovna Lebina and Aleksandr Nikolaevich Chistikov, 
Obyvatel´ i reformy: Kartiny povsednevnoi zhizni gorozhan v gody nepa i khrushcheskogo 
desiatiletiia (St. Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2003).
41 Amy Randall, The Soviet Dream World of Retail Trade and Consumption in the 1930s 
(Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), quotations 179, 4.
42 Perhaps if the Nazis had not invaded, there would be “Mikoian’s” as well as McDonald’s 
in Russia. See Jukka Gronow, Caviar with Champagne: Common Luxury and the Ideals of the 
Good Life in Stalin’s Russia (Oxford: Berg, 2003): 1–2, 73–74, and on other delegations abroad, 
75–79. See also Julie Hessler, A Social History of Soviet Trade: Trade Policy, Retail Practices, and 
Consumption, 1917–1953 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 205, 334. For a 
new work on luxury goods in the communist world, see David Crowley and Susan E. Reid, 
eds., Pleasures in Socialism: Leisure and Luxury in the Eastern Bloc (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press, 2010). 
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clean, orderly table made aesthetically pleasing with its tablecloth, flowers, and 
almost geometrically arranged array of products—implicitly presents these 
products as components of a contemporary, cultured lifestyle. This encapsulates 
the link between Soviet consumption and the kul´turnost´ campaign. Randi Cox 
has found that Soviet advertising, even during the height of the ascetic, class-
war productionism of Stalin’s Great Break, introduced “Westernized images of 
glamour and beauty.” At the same time, during the campaign for “cultured trade” 
Soviet department stores were in theory supposed to serve as “educational sites 
dedicated to increasing the cultural level of consumers.” Even shop windows were 
supposed to fulfill a “pedagogical task.”43 
The literature on Stalin-era consumption, while it contains evocative 
comparisons and consideration of competitive borrowing from Western 
countries, has thus far explored cross-border exchanges only episodically. 
Would it be possible to write a dissertation about Mikoian’s America?44 The 
43 Randi Cox, “All This Can Be Yours! Soviet Commercial Advertising and the Social 
Construction of Space, 1928–1956,” in The Landscape of Stalinism: The Art and Ideology of Soviet 
Space, ed. Evgeny Dobrenko and Eric Naiman (Seattle: University of Washington, 2003), 139.
44 In this regard, see the commentary in Erika Wolf, ed., Ilf and Petrov’s American Road Trip: 
The 1935 Travelogue of Two Soviet Writers Ilia Ilf and Evgeny Petrov, trans. Anne O. Fisher (New 
York: Cabinet Books and Princeton Architectural Press, 2007).
Buy Food Concentrates, 1939 advertisement  
Reproduced with permission of the Graphics Division of the Russian State 
Library. Published in Randall, Soviet Dream World, 33
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rewards of shifting the center of attention to the moment of transnational 
interaction is suggested by an in-depth comparison by Steven Harris of Soviet 
architects and housing experts’ publications (in Britain in 1947) and travel 
(in the United States in 1955), in which he is able to recover motivations and 
interactive perceptions on both sides of the encounters.45 
It is in the period of the Thaw and the cultural Cold War that the 
transnational dimensions of consumption under communism have truly 
blossomed.46 In part, this is because consumption was intimately linked 
with other international developments, including Khrushchev’s new 
engagement with the outside world—reflecting the attempt to enhance 
Soviet international status through his “peaceful coexistence” strategy and 
a remarkably optimistic renewal of open cultural–diplomatic competition 
with the West.47 Significant increases in travel and cultural traffic to and from 
the USSR, with the inevitably intense scrutiny of consumption elsewhere, 
reverberated throughout Soviet society and culture. For example, Anne 
Gorsuch’s study of filmic representations of the West shows how intimately 
they were linked to the new tourism and ideological warnings about the 
allure of Western material culture—but also to images of Soviet modernity 
and civilized consumption that were, strikingly, derived from a “western, 
specifically European, model.”48 A series of remarkable international openings 
took place inside the country: the sensational Picasso exhibit in 1956, the 
mass exhilaration of the World Youth Festival in 1957, and the unprecedented 
45 Steven E. Harris, “Two Lessons in Modernism: What the Architectural Review and America’s 
Mass Media Taught Soviet Architects about the West,” Trondheim Studies on East European 
Cultures and Societies, no. 31 (August 2010). 
46 For example, see Eleonory Gilburd and Larissa Zakharova, eds., “Repenser le Dégel: 
Versions du socialisme, influences internationales et société soviétique,” special issue of Cahiers 
du monde russe 43, 1–2 (2006).
47 Vladislav Zubok, Zhivago’s Children: The Last Russian Intelligentsia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2009), chap. 3; Robert English, Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, 
Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000); Michael 
David-Fox, “Toward the Cultural Cold War,” conclusion to Showcasing the Great Experiment. 
48 Anne E. Gorsuch, “From Iron Curtain to Silver Screen: Imagining the West in the Khrushchev 
Era,” in Imagining the West in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, ed. György Péteri (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010), 153–71. On the opening of the country and travel more 
broadly, see Stephen Lovell, “From Isolationism to Globalization,” chap. 9 of The Shadow of War: 
Russia and the USSR, 1941 to Present (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010); Gorsuch and Diane 
P. Koenker, eds., Turizm: The Russian and East European Tourist under Capitalism and Socialism 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006). For a new work containing much material on 
concrete cross-border contacts outside the capital cities during the Brezhnev period, see Sergei I. 
Zhuk, Rock and Roll in the Rocket City: The West, Identity, and Ideology in Soviet Dniepropetrovsk, 
1960–1985 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010); on the imaginary West under 
late socialism, see Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, until It Was No More: The Last Soviet 
Generation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), chap. 5.
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American National Exhibition at Sokol´niki Park in the summer of 1959.49 
Khrushchev’s declaration that the USSR would “catch up and overtake” the 
United States in consumption directly linked his effort to boost the retail 
sector and his mass housing campaign to the Cold War. 
Exploration of another major historical development has directly shaped 
the new historiography: the creation of a “Soviet bloc” in Eastern Europe after 
the late 1940s and by extension the communist “second world.” Soviet travel 
and interaction with the bloc countries became a major factor in Soviet history; 
the new, “socialist” transnational exchange had distinctly different dynamics 
than interactions with kapstrany (capitalist countries).50 In historiographical 
terms, moreover, consumerism and related topics have become central issues 
in the post-1989 literature on communist East Central Europe.51 Interest 
in socialist consumerism and transnationalism has thus renewed the Soviet 
field’s connections to Eastern Europe more than at any time in the decade 
and a half after 1989, when for geopolitical and institutional reasons the two 
fields were largely de-coupled. 
Susan Reid, whose interest in consumption and everyday culture is 
complemented by her interests in modernism, design, and visual culture, has 
contributed to the study of the Cold War kitchen and mass housing in the 
Khrushchev period. Perhaps her most suggestively transnational publication 
thus far has been her 2008 Kritika article on the American National Exhibition 
in Sokol´niki Park, visited by over 2.7 million Soviet citizens in six weeks in 
the summer of 1959, for which she worked in U.S. as well as Soviet archives. 
Reid challenged the simplistic notion that the exhibition, and by extension 
American superiority in the realm of consumption, led inexorably to the 
collapse of communism. Studying the complex source of exhibition comment 
49 Eleanory Gilburd, “Picasso in Thaw Culture,” Cahiers du monde russe 47, 1–2 (2006): 65–
108; Pia Koivunen, “The 1957 Moscow Youth Festival: Propagating a New, Peaceful Image of 
the Soviet Union,” in Soviet State and Society under Nikita Khrushchev, ed. Melanie Ilič and 
Jeremy Smith (London: Routledge, 2009), 45–65. On 23 July 2009, on the 50th anniversary 
of the Sokol´niki exhibition, I attended the commemorative conference at George Washington 
University, “Face-off to Facebook: From the Nixon–Khrushchev Kitchen Debate to Public 
Diplomacy in the 21st Century,” whose participants included dozens of former exhibit guides 
and staff.
50 See Elidor Mëhilli, “The Socialist Design: Urban Dilemmas in Postwar Europe and the 
Soviet Union,” review article forthcoming in Kritika, 2012. For an extended argument, see 
Michael David-Fox, “The Iron Curtain as Semi-Permeable Membrane: The Origins and 
Demise of the Stalinist Superiority Complex,” in Cold War Crossings: International Travel 
and Exchange across the Soviet Bloc, 1940s–1960s, ed. Patryk Babiracki and Kenyon Zimmer 
(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, forthcoming 2013).
51 For example, Péteri, ed., Imagining the West; Greg Castillo, Cold War on the Home Front: 
The Soft Power of Midcentury Design (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010); and 
Paulina Bren, The Greengrocer and His TV: The Culture of Communism after the 1968 Prague 
Spring (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010).
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books, she argued that 1959 was a “battle of claims and images” and that 
U.S. triumph was far from a foregone conclusion. At a moment when, she 
implies, an alternative, different, Soviet type of consumption was eminently 
conceivable, the message Soviets received from the exhibition was ambiguous. 
What, then, most distinguished socialist consumption under Khrushchev? Reid 
stresses how a significant strand of Soviet responses to the American exhibition 
stressed “enlightenment, not entertainment, self-development rather than self-
gratification,” rational consumption over “glitter,” and culture over goods.52 One 
can infer from this stress on “cultured” and modern consumption in the 1950s 
that there are as yet not fully explored lines of continuity between the Thaw and 
the kul´turnost´ campaign of the 1930s, itself a component part of a broader 
cultural revolution of the entire 1920s and 1930s. Indeed, the roots are even 
deeper if one takes into account how Soviet cultural diplomacy staked claims 
of superiority not on consumer goods but workers’ living standards, model 
workers’ housing, and welfare in the 1920s and early 1930s.53 In any event, in 
a recent commentary Reid underscores one of her main conclusions: the Soviet 
version was far from a “carbon copy of Western, capitalist consumption.”54
As this emphasis on Soviet alterity underscores, we are also beyond the 
stage in the discussion when the mere fact that the Soviets tried to compete 
in the realm of consumption is depicted as a fateful move leading directly 
to collapse in 1991. However, prominent students of consumption in the 
East European context have advanced interpretations that differ in emphasis 
from Reid’s. For example, György Péteri has argued that attempts to forge a 
distinctive form of communist consumerism in practice came too late to alter 
already well-established, everyday patterns in which Western-style acquisitive 
consumerism had already been replicated, especially by elites. In his work on 
Hungarian automobilism, Péteri shows how Khrushchev’s scheme to promote 
a giant system of collectivist car pools over private use was undermined 
from the very start in the Hungarian case by nomenklatura elites and easily 
abandoned under reform communism. This represented, in his words, “the 
failure of the state-socialist social order to assert its systemic exceptionalism 
… in the field of modern mobility.”55 In his wide-ranging exploration of 
52 Susan E. Reid, “Who Will Beat Whom? Soviet Popular Reception of the American 
Exhibition in Moscow, 1959,” Kritika 9, 4 (2008): 855–904.
53 Erika Wolf, “USSR in Construction: From Avant-Garde to Socialist Realist Practice” (Ph.D. 
diss., University of Michigan, 1999), 80–123; David-Fox, Showcasing the Great Experiment, 
chap. 5. 
54 Susan E. Reid, “Consumption and Everyday Culture after Stalin,” Russian Studies in History 
48, 1 (2009): 3–9, quotation 4.
55 György Péteri, “Alternative Modernity? Everyday Practices of Elite Mobility in Communist 
Hungary, 1956–1980,” paper presented at the panel “Consumerism and the Fall of 
Communism,” Eighth World Congress of the International Council for Central and East 
European Studies (ICEEES), Stockholm, July 2011; his chapter of the same title will be 
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home design and domestic culture in the Cold War German Democratic 
Republic, Greg Castillo has characterized three successive “consumption 
regimes”: virtual (Socialist Realist); virtuous (the Thaw-era attempt to create 
a distinctively socialist consumer culture); and subversive (late socialism). Yet, 
much like Péteri, Castillo concludes that the second phase never truly got off 
the ground and led directly into the third: “The modernist dream of a virtuous 
consumption regime, far from producing ideal socialist subjects, had become 
a finishing school for the disenfranchised.”56 
How communist regimes attempted to reconcile an increasingly overt 
stress on consumption with the imperative of distinguishing socialism is 
being investigated by research into how consumption regimes were conceived 
ideologically and embedded in the planned economy and everyday culture. 
Here let us recognize the limits of transnational research. A focus on moments 
of international contact alone cannot fully inquire into how consumption 
functioned within a deep context framed in part by “socialist industry,” the 
black market, popular attitudes, and the culture of shortages—in short, the 
space “between ideology and the everyday.”57 
Conclusion
The concept of the “transnational” is not a precise one. It means different 
things to different scholars and, I have argued, is also being employed in 
various ways in numerous fields and subfields. This essay has suggested 
how transnational research, far from representing a sharp break in the 
historiography, has amplified certain long-standing concerns in the field: 
the import and reception of foreign models; the fundamental concern 
with delineating Russian and Soviet particularism and comparability; and 
the foundational historiographical topic of “Russia and the West.” In more 
immediate terms, the transnational research of the 2000s emerged out of the 
greater concern with comparative history, debates about Russian and Soviet 
modernity, and the concern with perceptions of the “Other” in the cultural 
history of the 1990s. What the new interest in transnationalism has done 
is to direct research more sharply toward the moments and mechanisms of 
exchange and two-sided examinations of international interactions. 
published in The Socialist Car: Automobility in the Eastern Bloc, ed. Lewis Siegelbaum (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, forthcoming 2011); see also Péteri, “Streetcars of Desire: Cars 
and Automobilism in Communist Hungary (1958–70),” Social History 34, 1 (2009): 1–28, 
quotation from Khrushchev, 8.
56 Greg Castillo, “Virtual, Virtuous, Subversive: Shifting Household Consumption Regimes 
in the GDR,” paper presented at the panel “Consumerism and the Fall of Communism,” 
Eighth ICEEES World Congress, Stockholm, July 2010.
57 Here I am quoting the subtitle of Ol´ga Gurova’s interesting study, Sovetskoe nizhnee bel´e: 
Mezhdu ideologiei i povsednevnost´iu (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2008).
904 MICHAEL DAVID-FOX
The number of citations here to very recent publications and forthcoming 
works suggests that the transnational turn gathered steam in the last years of 
the 2000s. Its impact on the historiography, most likely, has far from crested. 
In this regard, it should be noted that Russian–European and Soviet–American 
interactions have been examined far more than other parts of the world. This 
is not merely a historiographical issue but a linguistic one, since truly bilateral 
or multilateral studies demand high-level training. If in the American context 
transnationalism might be criticized as replicating a “United States and the 
world” approach, in the Russian context it should not simply reinscribe the 
focus on “Russia and the West.” To be sure, revealing new works could have 
been cited involving Russian–Soviet relations with China, the Ottoman 
Empire and Turkey, Japan, and other parts of the world.58 Unfortunately, 
however, these areas remain very much underrepresented.
At the same time, it must be recognized that the competitive emulation 
of the West is one of the central features of Russian and Soviet history that 
gives transnational approaches in this context their singularity. Layered 
onto the history of imperial Russian “Westernization” and the great debates 
over national identity, Soviet-era isolationism and ideological competition 
imparted an outsized significance—both positive and negative—to 
international and especially Western contacts under communism. This has 
given examination of cross-border exchange in this area the unusual potential 
for revising hitherto largely internalist grand narratives, particularly in terms 
of understanding the formation and fall of the Soviet system. This potential 
derives from two features of transnational research in this field. The first is the 
centrality of not just goods and people crossing actual borders but the way 
“really-existing” exchanges were caught up with ideas and ideologies about 
the outside world, which deeply affected successive openings and closings; 
the second is the way those contacts, especially across the semipermeable 
membrane erected with the outside world in the Soviet period, illuminate the 
nexus between the Soviet system’s external and internal dimensions. Perhaps 
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58 On the period of the Cold War, see, for example, the works discussed in David Engerman, 
“The Second World’s Third World,” Kritika 12, 1 (2011): 183–211.
